CVE-2026-64618: Apache Fineract SQL Injection Vulnerability

This issue affects Apache Fineract versions up to and including 1.15.0. The Center read endpoint (GET /api/v1/centers) and the datatable entry read endpoints (GET /api/v1/datatables/{datatable}/{apptableId} and GET /api/v1/datatables/{datatable}/{apptableId}/{datatableId}) concatenate caller-supplied ordering parameters (orderBy, sortOrder, order) directly into the SQL ORDER BY clause. The existing regex-based input validation can be bypassed, allowing time-based blind SQL injection by any authenticated user with read access to centers or to the targeted datatable. Users are recommended to upgrade to 1.16.1 which fixes the issue.

: Session Fixation / Session Reuse across Users vulnerability in Apache Jackrabbit. Jackrabbit WebDAV server attaches a cached authenticated session on any Lock-Token/TransactionId/SubscriptionId/If-header field token match with no credential check. This issue affects Apache Jackrabbit: from 2.23.0 through 2.23.5, from 2.22.0 through 2.22.4, from 2.20.0 through 2.20.17. Users are recommended to upgrade to versions 2.23.6, 2.22.5, or 2.20.18 which fix the issue.

Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') vulnerability in Apache Struts. Where a localized message formats a date or time argument, the formatter retained for that message by the application-wide text provider is used by concurrently served requests without isolation, so a value belonging to one user can appear in another user's response, or the rendering can fail and surface as a server error. Applications whose localized messages format no date or time arguments are not affected. This issue affects Apache Struts: from 2.0.0 through 2.3.37, from 2.5.0 through 2.5.33, from 6.0.0 through 6.11.0, from 7.0.0 through 7.3.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 6.12.0 or 7.4.0, which fixes the issue.

Apache NiFi Registry 0.4.0 through 2.11.0 are subject to path manipulation when storing extension bundle content using group, artifact, and version coordinates from uploaded NAR manifests. The default file persistence provider used coordinates as filesystem path components without rejected parent-directory names, and the path-containment check compared an unnormalized resolved path. An authenticated user authorized to write and delete bundles in a bucket can upload a NAR with a crafted manifest resulting in file system operations outside of the file persistence directory. Upgrading to Apache NiFi Registry 2.12.0 is the recommended mitigation, which rejects parent-directory coordinates and requires a normalized path to remain a strict child of the storage root location.

The two built-in name-finder patterns exposed by opennlp.tools.namefind.RegexNameFinderFactory - DEFAULT_REGEX_NAME_FINDER.EMAIL and DEFAULT_REGEX_NAME_FINDER.URL - contain ambiguous nested quantifiers. An application that obtains these finders through RegexNameFinderFactory.getDefaultRegexNameFinders(...) and then applies them to untrusted text through RegexNameFinder.find(String[]) or RegexNameFinder.find(String) can be driven into super-linear backtracking or into unbounded matcher recursion by a small crafted input. For the EMAIL pattern, a long run of local-part characters that is never followed by an @ forces the matcher to re-scan to end-of-input from every starting offset. Cost grows quadratically with input length: an input of approximately 32 KB consumes several seconds of CPU in a single find() call and returns no match, and each doubling of the input multiplies the cost roughly four-fold. For the URL pattern, the query-string sub-expression nests a capturing repetition inside an outer repetition. The JDK matcher recurses once per query token, so an input of approximately 4 KB containing many &-separated tokens exhausts the thread stack and causes java.lang.StackOverflowError to propagate out of find(), terminating the calling thread. On a thread created with a smaller stack (for example -Xss512k, typical of server worker pools) approximately 1 KB is sufficient. In both cases an attacker who can supply text for analysis can convert a single request into seconds to minutes of pinned CPU, or into an abrupt thread death, denying service to the embedding application. No authentication, special configuration, or model file is required beyond the application having selected one of the two built-in finders. This issue affects Apache OpenNLP: from 2.0.0 through 2.5.11; from 3.0.0-M1 through 3.0.0-M5. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.5.12, or to 3.0.0-M6 for users tracking the 3.0.0 milestone line, which fix the issue.

Apache Wicket enforces the upload limits configured on a form or upload field while parsing a multipart request with Apache Commons FileUpload. If the request body has already been consumed by another component, Commons FileUpload returns no items and Wicket falls back to reading the upload through HttpServletRequest#getParts(). The per-file size limit (for example Form#setFileMaxSize) and the file count limit (Form#setFileCountMax) are not applied to the parts obtained that way, and no exception is raised, so the upload is processed as though those limits had been satisfied. A remote uploader can therefore submit files that are larger, or more numerous, than the application permits, up to whatever the component that parsed the request allows. A part carrying no Content-Type header is additionally read into memory in full during parsing, so the size of that allocation is determined by the request and bounded only by those same external limits. The total upload size limit (Form#setMaxSize) is not affected. Commons FileUpload compares the declared Content-Length against it before reading the body, so a request declaring an oversized length is rejected before the fallback is reached. The fallback is reached in deployments where a servlet or filter has already parsed the request body — for example a servlet annotated with @MultipartConfig, Spring Boot's multipart resolver, or any filter that calls HttpServletRequest#getParameter() on a multipart request. It applies to the Wicket components that accept uploads on that path, including Form with FileUploadField, FileUploadToResourceField and AjaxFileDropBehavior. Applications that configure neither a per-file nor a file-count limit are not affected, as Wicket applies neither by default. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.18.0, from 9.0.0 through 9.23.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.10.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 8.19.0, 9.24.0 or 10.11.0, which fix the issue. Users of Apache Wicket 7.x or older, which are no longer supported, should upgrade to a supported version. As a workaround, configure equivalent limits in the component that parses the request — for example spring.servlet.multipart.max-file-size and max-request-size, or maxFileSize and maxRequestSize in @MultipartConfig or in the web.xml <multipart-config> element.