CVE-2026-56770: the affected product Security Vulnerability (CVSS 8.7)

HTSlib is a library for reading and writing bioinformatics file formats. CRAM is a compressed format which stores DNA sequence alignment data. As one method of removing redundant data, CRAM uses reference-based compression so that instead of storing the full sequence for each alignment record it stores a location in an external reference sequence along with a list of differences to the reference at that location as a sequence of "features". When decoding these features, an out-by-one error in a test for CRAM features that appear beyond the extent of the CRAM record sequence could result in an invalid write of one attacker-controlled byte beyond the end of a heap buffer. Exploiting this bug causes a heap buffer overflow. If a user opens a file crafted to exploit this issue, it could lead to the program crashing, or overwriting of data and heap structures in ways not expected by the program. It may be possible to use this to obtain arbitrary code execution. Versions 1.23.1, 1.22.2 and 1.21.1 include fixes for this issue. There is no workaround for this issue.

HTSlib is a library for reading and writing bioinformatics file formats. CRAM is a compressed format which stores DNA sequence alignment data. While most alignment records store DNA sequence and quality values, the format also allows them to omit this data in certain cases to save space. Due to some quirks of the CRAM format, it is necessary to handle these records carefully as they will actually store data that needs to be consumed and then discarded. Unfortunately the `cram_decode_seq()` did not handle this correctly in some cases. Where this happened it could result in reading a single byte from beyond the end of a heap allocation, followed by writing a single attacker-controlled byte to the same location. Exploiting this bug causes a heap buffer overflow. If a user opens a file crafted to exploit this issue, it could lead to the program crashing, or overwriting of data and heap structures in ways not expected by the program. It may be possible to use this to obtain arbitrary code execution. Versions 1.23.1, 1.22.2 and 1.21.1 include fixes for this issue. There is no workaround for this issue.

PJSIP is a free and open source multimedia communication library written in C. Prior to commit 673b978, a remote out-of-bounds read and write can occur in the SDP negotiator when the remote payload-type map maintenance feature is enabled. assign_pt_and_update_map() in pjmedia/src/pjmedia/sdp_neg.c uses payload-type numbers taken from a remote SDP offer or answer to index fixed-size internal tables without sufficient bounds validation, so a crafted remote SDP can cause memory access outside those tables. The practical impact is memory corruption and denial of service; code execution is not demonstrated. This path is only reached when PJMEDIA_SDP_NEG_MAINTAIN_REMOTE_PT_MAP is enabled. The default is disabled, so default builds are not affected; the feature is an interoperability option that integrating products may enable. This issue has been patched via commit 673b978.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: clk: samsung: exynos-clkout: Assign .num before accessing .hws Commit f316cdff8d67 ("clk: Annotate struct clk_hw_onecell_data with __counted_by") annotated the hws member of 'struct clk_hw_onecell_data' with __counted_by, which informs the bounds sanitizer (UBSAN_BOUNDS) about the number of elements in .hws[], so that it can warn when .hws[] is accessed out of bounds. As noted in that change, the __counted_by member must be initialized with the number of elements before the first array access happens, otherwise there will be a warning from each access prior to the initialization because the number of elements is zero. This occurs in exynos_clkout_probe() due to .num being assigned after .hws[] has been accessed: UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/clk/samsung/clk-exynos-clkout.c:178:18 index 0 is out of range for type 'clk_hw *[*]' Move the .num initialization to before the first access of .hws[], clearing up the warning.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: rose: fix invalid array index in rose_kill_by_device() rose_kill_by_device() collects sockets into a local array[] and then iterates over them to disconnect sockets bound to a device being brought down. The loop mistakenly indexes array[cnt] instead of array[i]. For cnt < ARRAY_SIZE(array), this reads an uninitialized entry; for cnt == ARRAY_SIZE(array), it is an out-of-bounds read. Either case can lead to an invalid socket pointer dereference and also leaks references taken via sock_hold(). Fix the index to use i.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: touchwin - reset the packet index on every complete packet tw_interrupt() accumulates each non-zero serial byte into a fixed three-byte buffer with a running index that is only reset once a full packet has been received *and* the device's two Y bytes agree: tw->data[tw->idx++] = data; if (tw->idx == TW_LENGTH && tw->data[1] == tw->data[2]) { ... tw->idx = 0; } The reset is gated on tw->data[1] == tw->data[2], a value the device controls. A malicious, malfunctioning or counterfeit Touchwindow peripheral can stream non-zero bytes whose 2nd and 3rd bytes differ: the index reaches TW_LENGTH without the equality holding, is never reset, and keeps growing, so tw->data[tw->idx++] walks off the end of the three-byte array and the rest of the heap-allocated struct tw, one attacker-chosen byte at a time -- an unbounded, device-driven heap out-of-bounds write. Reset the index on every completed packet and report an event only when the two Y bytes match, like the other serio touchscreen drivers do.