CVE-2026-48689: Pavel-Odintsov Fastnetmon Out of Bounds Write (CVSS 9.8)

FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the MikroTik router integration plugin. The _log() function in src/mikrotik_plugin/fastnetmon_mikrotik.php (lines 107-108) constructs shell commands by concatenating the $msg parameter directly into exec() calls: exec("echo `date` \"- {FASTNETMON] - " . $msg . " \" >> " . $FILE_LOG_TMP). This is identical in pattern to the Juniper plugin vulnerability. The $msg variable contains unsanitized attack data from command-line arguments. An attacker who can influence argv[] values can inject arbitrary shell commands. The fix is to replace exec() with file_put_contents() or use escapeshellarg().

FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains a configuration injection vulnerability in the Juniper router integration plugin. In src/juniper_plugin/fastnetmon_juniper.php, the $IP_ATTACK variable (received from argv[1]) is directly interpolated into Juniper NETCONF set-configuration commands at lines 69 and 90 without any validation or sanitization. Line 69: $conn->load_set_configuration("set routing-options static route {$IP_ATTACK} community 65535:666 discard"). Line 90: $conn->load_set_configuration("delete routing-options static route {$IP_ATTACK}/32"). An attacker who can control the IP address string can inject additional Juniper CLI configuration commands by embedding newline characters followed by arbitrary set/delete commands. This could modify the router's routing table, firewall filters, user accounts, or any other configuration element accessible via NETCONF. The impact is full router compromise.

FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 does not verify TLS certificates on outbound HTTPS connections. The execute_web_request_secure() function in src/fast_library.cpp creates a boost::asio::ssl::context with tls_client mode and calls set_default_verify_paths() to load CA certificates, but never calls set_verify_mode(boost::asio::ssl::verify_peer). Without this call, OpenSSL performs the TLS handshake without validating the server's certificate chain, making all HTTPS connections vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. This function is used for telemetry reporting to community-stats.fastnetmon.com, which sends system information including CPU model, kernel version, traffic statistics, and software configuration. An attacker can intercept and modify this data or redirect it to a malicious server.

FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an integer overflow in the BGP AS_PATH attribute encoder. In src/bgp_protocol.hpp, the IPv4UnicastAnnounce::get_attributes() function computes attribute_length as 'sizeof(bgp_as_path_segment_element_t) + this->as_path_asns.size() * sizeof(uint32_t)' and stores it in a uint8_t field (line 600-605). Since uint8_t can only hold values 0-255, an AS_PATH containing more than 63 ASNs (2 + 64*4 = 258 > 255) causes silent truncation. The truncated length is used for buffer sizing, while the actual data written is the full untruncated amount, resulting in a heap buffer overflow. Similarly, the path_segment_length field at line 621 is also uint8_t, truncating with more than 255 ASNs.

FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an integer overflow vulnerability in the packet capture buffer allocation. In src/packet_storage.hpp, the allocate_buffer() function computes memory_size_in_bytes as 'buffer_size_in_packets * (max_captured_packet_size + sizeof(fastnetmon_pcap_pkthdr_t)) + sizeof(fastnetmon_pcap_file_header_t)' using unsigned int (32-bit) arithmetic. With max_captured_packet_size=1500 and sizeof(fastnetmon_pcap_pkthdr_t)=16, each packet requires approximately 1516 bytes. If buffer_size_in_packets exceeds approximately 2,832,542, the multiplication overflows, resulting in a much smaller allocation than expected. Subsequent write_packet() calls then write past the allocated buffer, causing heap corruption. The buffer_size_in_packets value is derived from the ban_details_records_count configuration parameter, which is parsed using atoi() with no overflow checking.

FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 exposes a gRPC API server on port 50052 with no authentication mechanism. The server is initialized with grpc::InsecureServerCredentials() (src/fastnetmon.cpp line 477) and a source code comment explicitly acknowledges 'Listen on the given address without any authentication mechanism.' None of the RPC methods in src/api.cpp (ExecuteBan, ExecuteUnBan, GetBanlist, GetTotalTrafficCounters, etc.) perform any credential verification. The ExecuteBan and ExecuteUnBan methods trigger security-critical actions: BGP route announcements that can blackhole network traffic, and execution of external notification scripts via popen(). An attacker with local network access can ban arbitrary IP addresses (causing denial of service to legitimate traffic), unban active attacks (disabling DDoS mitigation), and trigger script execution. There is also no role-based access control separating read-only monitoring from destructive administrative operations.