Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CVE.org, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS
CVE-2026-130070 Overview
Ghost by muneeb141 on the main branch from commit c731cdf through commit 672dfec contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the whitelisted ghost.api.ghost.convert_to_real_user method that allows unauthenticated attackers to skip OTP verification by setting the client-supplied bypass_otp parameter. Attackers can obtain a ghost session from the guest-accessible create_ghost_session endpoint, then call convert_to_real_user with an arbitrary real_email and bypass_otp=1 to receive OAuth tokens for existing accounts and take them over.
Critical Impact
Affected Products
- whitelisted ghost.api.ghost.convert_to_real_user method that: see the vendor advisory for the exact affected versions
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-11-16: CVE-2026-130070 published to the National Vulnerability Database by disclosure@vulncheck.com
- 2026-11-16: last updated in the NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-130070
Vulnerability Analysis
CVE-2026-130070 is a Security Vulnerability weakness (CWE-807) in whitelisted ghost.api.ghost.convert_to_real_user method that. Based on its CVSS vector, the flaw can be reached over the network, needs no login, and needs no user interaction.
With a CVSS base score of 9.3, apply the vendor fix and confirm exposure on internet facing and business critical assets first.
Root Cause
The vendor description states: Ghost by muneeb141 on the main branch from commit c731cdf through commit 672dfec contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the whitelisted ghost.api.ghost.convert_to_real_user method that allows unauthenticated attackers to skip OTP verification by setting the client-supplied bypass_otp parameter. Attackers can obtain a ghost session from the guest-accessible create_ghost_session endpoint, then call convert_to_real_user with an arbitrary real_email and bypass_otp=1 to receive OAuth tokens for existing accounts and take them over.
Attack Vector
Based on the CVSS vector, the flaw can be reached over the network, needs no login, and needs no user interaction. Attack complexity is low complexity.
No exploitation in the wild is confirmed by CISA at the time of the last update. Check the references below for any vendor or researcher proof of concept.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-130070
Detection Strategies
- Inventory every instance of whitelisted ghost.api.ghost.convert_to_real_user method that and compare the running version with the affected range above.
- Check external attack surface scans for internet facing instances of the component.
- Run an authenticated vulnerability scan once your scanner ships a check for this CVE.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward whitelisted ghost.api.ghost.convert_to_real_user method that application, access and audit logs to your SIEM for retrospective hunting.
- Alert on new processes, configuration changes or outbound connections from the affected service.
- Track the vendor advisory and the CISA KEV catalog for changes in exploitation status.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-130070
Immediate Actions Required
- Apply the fixed version of whitelisted ghost.api.ghost.convert_to_real_user method that named in the vendor advisory.
- Prioritize internet facing and business critical instances first.
- Rescan after the change to confirm the exposure is closed.
Patch Information
Use the fixed version listed in the vendor advisory for whitelisted ghost.api.ghost.convert_to_real_user method that.
Workarounds
- If patching must wait, restrict network access to the affected service and place it behind authentication or a web application firewall rule.
CWE References
Technical References
This entry is built directly from NVD, CISA KEV and EPSS data. Verify fixed versions in the vendor advisory before you deploy.
Frequently asked questions
Related CVEs
Argo Workflows is an open source container-native workflow engine for orchestrating parallel jobs on Kubernetes. From 2.9.0 to before 4.0.2 and 3.7.11, A user who can submit Workflows can completely bypass all security settings defined in a WorkflowTemplate by including a podSpecPatch field in their Workflow submission. This works even when the controller is configured with templateReferencing: Strict, which is specifically documented as a mechanism to restrict users to admin-approved templates. The podSpecPatch field on a submitted Workflow takes precedence over the referenced WorkflowTemplate during spec merging and is applied directly to the pod spec at creation time with no security validation. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.0.2 and 3.7.11.
Eclipse Kura versions prior to 5.6.2 trust the client-supplied X-Forwarded-For HTTP header as the authoritative source of the client IP address in audit log entries. The org.eclipse.kura.web2 (Web Console) and org.eclipse.kura.rest.provider (REST API) components use this header as the primary IP source when initializing audit context, and org.eclipse.kura.jetty.customizer unconditionally installs Jetty's ForwardedRequestCustomizer on all HTTP/HTTPS connectors, causing HttpServletRequest.getRemoteAddr() to reflect the attacker-controlled header value. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to bypass IP-based brute-force protections — such as fail2ban — by spoofing the logged IP address to a non-routable value, allowing a brute-force attack to proceed undetected, or to cause a denial of service against a third party by injecting a victim's IP address and triggering a ban on that address.
Reliance on untrusted inputs in a security decision in Microsoft Exchange Server allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.
Reliance on untrusted inputs in a security decision in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass a security feature locally.
Traefik is an HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. From 3.7.0 until 3.7.3, there is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's domain-fronting protection (SNICheck) that allows an unauthenticated client to bypass mutual TLS enforced through wildcard router TLSOptions. When a router uses a wildcard host rule such as Host(*.example.com) with stricter TLS options (for example RequireAndVerifyClientCert), SNICheck resolves the TLS options for the HTTP Host header using exact map lookups only and never applies wildcard matching. If another permissive SNI is served on the same entrypoint, an attacker can complete the TLS handshake under the permissive options and then send an HTTP Host header targeting the wildcard-protected backend, reaching it without presenting a client certificate. This affects the regular HTTPS / HTTP-2 path and does not require HTTP/3. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.7.3.
Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. Versions prior to 2.1.53 resolved the permission mode from settings files, including the repo-controlled .claude/settings.json, before determining whether to display the workspace trust confirmation dialog. A malicious repository could set permissions.defaultMode to bypassPermissions in its committed .claude/settings.json, causing the trust dialog to be silently skipped on first open. This allowed a user to be placed into a permissive mode without seeing the trust confirmation prompt, making it easier for an attacker-controlled repository to gain tool execution without explicit user consent. This issue has been patched in version 2.1.53.
Earn your free CTEM certification.
Learn to scope, prioritize, validate and mobilize fixes for CVEs like CVE-2026-130070 with a free CTEM certification.
Beginner / Practitioner / Program Leader
Explore certifications