CVE-2026-123487: Parse Server Security Vulnerability

The two built-in name-finder patterns exposed by opennlp.tools.namefind.RegexNameFinderFactory - DEFAULT_REGEX_NAME_FINDER.EMAIL and DEFAULT_REGEX_NAME_FINDER.URL - contain ambiguous nested quantifiers. An application that obtains these finders through RegexNameFinderFactory.getDefaultRegexNameFinders(...) and then applies them to untrusted text through RegexNameFinder.find(String[]) or RegexNameFinder.find(String) can be driven into super-linear backtracking or into unbounded matcher recursion by a small crafted input. For the EMAIL pattern, a long run of local-part characters that is never followed by an @ forces the matcher to re-scan to end-of-input from every starting offset. Cost grows quadratically with input length: an input of approximately 32 KB consumes several seconds of CPU in a single find() call and returns no match, and each doubling of the input multiplies the cost roughly four-fold. For the URL pattern, the query-string sub-expression nests a capturing repetition inside an outer repetition. The JDK matcher recurses once per query token, so an input of approximately 4 KB containing many &-separated tokens exhausts the thread stack and causes java.lang.StackOverflowError to propagate out of find(), terminating the calling thread. On a thread created with a smaller stack (for example -Xss512k, typical of server worker pools) approximately 1 KB is sufficient. In both cases an attacker who can supply text for analysis can convert a single request into seconds to minutes of pinned CPU, or into an abrupt thread death, denying service to the embedding application. No authentication, special configuration, or model file is required beyond the application having selected one of the two built-in finders. This issue affects Apache OpenNLP: from 2.0.0 through 2.5.11; from 3.0.0-M1 through 3.0.0-M5. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.5.12, or to 3.0.0-M6 for users tracking the 3.0.0 milestone line, which fix the issue.

vLLM is a high-throughput and memory-efficient inference and serving engine for LLMs. Prior to 0.24.0, the structured_outputs.regex API parameter passes a user-supplied regular expression string directly to the grammar compiler backends with no compilation timeout; in the xgrammar backend the string reaches the regex compiler with no guard, and in the outlines backend the validation step blocks structural issues such as lookarounds and backreferences but performs no complexity analysis, so a pattern with nested quantifiers passes all checks and causes exponential state-space expansion, allowing a single request containing an adversarial regex to hang an inference worker indefinitely and deny service. This issue is fixed in version 0.24.0.

LangChain versions up to and including 0.3.1 contain a regular expression denial-of-service (ReDoS) vulnerability in the MRKLOutputParser.parse() method (libs/langchain/langchain/agents/mrkl/output_parser.py). The parser applies a backtracking-prone regular expression when extracting tool actions from model output. An attacker who can supply or influence the parsed text (for example via prompt injection in downstream applications that pass LLM output directly into MRKLOutputParser.parse()) can trigger excessive CPU consumption by providing a crafted payload, causing significant parsing delays and a denial-of-service condition.

@hapi/content provided HTTP Content-* headers parsing. All versions of @hapi/content through 6.0.0 are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via crafted HTTP header values. Three regular expressions used to parse Content-Type and Content-Disposition headers contain patterns susceptible to catastrophic backtracking. This vulnerability is fixed in 6.0.1.

minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Versions 10.2.0 and below are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when a glob pattern contains many consecutive * wildcards followed by a literal character that doesn't appear in the test string. Each * compiles to a separate [^/]*? regex group, and when the match fails, V8's regex engine backtracks exponentially across all possible splits. The time complexity is O(4^N) where N is the number of * characters. With N=15, a single minimatch() call takes ~2 seconds. With N=34, it hangs effectively forever. Any application that passes user-controlled strings to minimatch() as the pattern argument is vulnerable to DoS. This issue has been fixed in version 10.2.1.

Anthropic's MCP TypeScript SDK versions up to and including 1.25.1 contain a regular expression denial of service (ReDoS) vulnerability in the UriTemplate class when processing RFC 6570 exploded array patterns. The dynamically generated regular expression used during URI matching contains nested quantifiers that can trigger catastrophic backtracking on specially crafted inputs, resulting in excessive CPU consumption. An attacker can exploit this by supplying a malicious URI that causes the Node.js process to become unresponsive, leading to a denial of service.