CVE-2026-122220: WPO365 | LOGIN (wpo365-login) plugin Security Vulnerability

A SAML authentication replay vulnerability in Rancher's Assertion Consumer Service (ACS) handler did not enforce one-time use of SAML assertion, potentially allowing person in the middle attacks against Rancher, affecting Rancher 2.14.0 before 2.14.3,

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to obtain paid resources by resubmitting one settled on-chain transfer. MPP.Methods.EVM.verify/2 accepts a transaction-hash credential and matches a transfer purely on token, to and amount (ERC-20) or to and value (native). It binds the proof neither to the challenge being verified nor to any record of prior use, and the generic MPP.Plug dedup store keys on challenge.id, which is regenerated for every 402 response. On a static-price route, a single historical transfer matching the charge therefore satisfies an unbounded number of later charges, including transfers an attacker can read off a public block explorer. This issue affects mpp: from 0.3.0 before 0.6.3.

Snipe-IT before 8.5.0 contains a SAML assertion replay vulnerability that allows attackers to reuse captured assertions by exploiting a non-atomic nonce check in the SAML acs handler. Attackers can send concurrent POST requests to /saml/acs with one captured assertion to obtain multiple authenticated victim sessions that evade IdP-driven revocation.

OneUptime is a solution for monitoring and managing online services. In version 10.0.11 and prior, the WebAuthn authentication implementation does not store the challenge on the server side. Instead, the challenge is returned to the client and accepted back from the client request body during verification. This violates the WebAuthn specification (W3C Web Authentication Level 2, §13.4.3) and allows an attacker who has obtained a valid WebAuthn assertion (e.g., via XSS, MitM, or log exposure) to replay it indefinitely, completely bypassing the second-factor authentication. No known patches are available.

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated third party to obtain paid resources by replaying a transfer settled by an unrelated payer. MPP.Methods.Tempo normally binds a settled TIP-20 TransferWithMemo to the specific challenge under verification through an attribution nonce carried in the memo. When a static "memo" is configured in method_config, check_matched_memo_binding/3 returns the match unconditionally and that binding is skipped, leaving only token, recipient, amount and the static memo value to match on. The static memo is echoed in every unauthenticated 402 response and Tempo transfers are public, so an attacker can take any matching transfer paid by a legitimate customer, request a fresh challenge for the same route, and present that transaction hash as a type="hash" credential. The hash path performs no sender or signature check tying the presenter to the wallet that broadcast the transfer. This issue affects mpp: from 0.6.1 before 0.6.4.

A flaw was found in Red Hat Advanced Cluster Security for Kubernetes (RHACS). The Central SAML authentication ACS endpoint does not retain used SAML assertion or response identifiers to prevent replay. An attacker who obtains a valid, unexpired signed SAML response can submit it multiple times and receive distinct Central authentication tokens for the mapped identity.